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NOTES
THE FUNCTION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE
DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION OF POWERS
BY ADMIVNISTRATIVE AGENCIES
The best composition and temperature is, to have openness in
fame and opinion; secrecy in habit; dissimulation in seasonable
use; and a power to feign if there be no remedy.
Francis Bacon, Essays,
"Of Simulation and Dissimulation"
Francis Bacon would agree that it is impossible not to leave an
indication of what is actually being done where what is being done
must be disclosed for the world to see. Even so, the cursory or naive
may still be misled.
As is to be expected, the justices of the Supreme Court seldom
espouse the fact that the Court has been responsible for the acquisition by administrative agencies of certain powers.1 However, the fact
itself is not open to real dispute, 2 nor stated alone of any especial
significance. What is of significance are answers to: when, and to
what extent does the Court "grant" powers? The justices do not
answer these questions explicitly. The purpose of this Note is to
examine this neglected area of the law to find, if possible, a common
law 3 of how the Court decides a case where it can be said that the
Court in a manner is granting or denying power to an administrative
agency.
For purposes of this Note powers may be defined as those separate ingredients of an administrative action which are present in
an act of an agency which is either legal or valid (in practice, upheld if attacked). In this sense, it is important to think of the
administrative process as a whole, for example, when an agency
makes an order, the order relies for its validity as much on jurisdiction as on the ability of the agency to make the kind of remedy
it has made. Agency action is not simple reflex reaction; it is the
culmination of an ability to consider, consideration, and of a
remedial determination or dismissal based on the consideration. For
purposes of this Note the three steps in agency action will be
called: jurisdiction; statutory standards which define the limits
1. For an .exception to the usual judicial silence, see the statement of
Mr. Justice Jackson quoted in:fra at note 14.
2. See Davis, Administrative Law 2 (1951). "[T]he great bulk of...
[administrative law] is created by courts in the process of constitutional and
statutory interpretation."
3. "Common law" is used here in the sense of an essentially consistent
judge-made law.
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of agency consideration; and enforcement and remedial powers.
This classification, as any which attempts to separate a process,
will have elements of artificiality, and thus cases will arise which
do not readily permit classification. 4
JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is a primary power in either the judicial or administrative process. Other powers rest upon jurisdiction-if jurisdiction is not present, one need proceed no further in determining the
existence of other powers.
The fact that jurisdiction either is or is not present does not
mean that jurisdiction is easily determined. In cases which consider the question of whether jurisdiction over the subject-matter
exists in the agency, there are many close decisions both in the sense
that good arguments are available to each side and in the closeness
of the division of the Court over what is the proper determination.5
Often as many as four justices absent themselves from majority
opinion and appear either in separate opinions or the inevitably
"vigorous" dissents.6
The Court is hardly at fault for the difficulty of the decisions.
The difficulty of the jurisdictional cases is the direct result of the
highly ambiguous and uncertain language with which the Court
is often forced to deal. Despite congressional vagueness, one fact
is clear. Congress created agencies which were to have an effective
amount of jurisdiction, but, just as clearly, no more jurisdiction
than needed to accomplish the end sought. In trying to strike the
balance between too much and too little, with scant substance to
guide them, the several justices must necessarily fall back on their
own bias or belief in reaching a decision. This statement finds support in the frequency of sharply conflicting majority and dissenting
7

opinions.

There are several kinds of cases which come to the Court in
which jurisdiction of an administrative agency becomes involved.
The three most often before the Court are: disputes over jurisdiction between similar state and federal agencies; disputes over jurisdiction within the federal regulatory system; and, disputes over
4. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Budd, 350 U.S. 473 (1956).
5. See East Texas Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Frozen Food
351 U.S. 49 (1956); Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, 349
(1955); United States v. Champlin Refining Co., 341 U.S. 290
Federal Power Commission v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.,
498 (1949).
6. See cases cited note 5 supra.
7. See cases cited note 5 supra.

Express,
U.S. 435
(1951);
337 U.S.

NOTE

the scope or coverage of the statute as written. Of these three, the
last two resemble each other, while the first is inherently different
because the existence of some kind of jurisdiction is not disputed.
The problem of jurisdictional disputes between state and federal
agencies.
8
In United States v. Public Utilities Commission of California
the Court was called upon to settle a dispute which arose between the
California Public Utilities Commission and the Federal Power Commission over which had jurisdiction of electric power sent from
California into Nevada to the Navy and a Nevada county where
the power was resold. The power company which was the center of
this jurisdictional dispute was licensed under Part I of the Federal
Power Act.
The jurisdiction as claimed by both sides comes from the Federal
Power Act. The state claimed that it had jurisdiction both through
Part P9 of the Act which provides in substance that the federal
agency and not the state will have jurisdiction where interstate
commerce is involved if either (1) any of the states directly affected
has failed to provide a regulatory agency or (2) the state agencies
cannot agree, and also through Part I110 which grants federal jurisdiction over "the transmission of electric energy ... at wholesale
in interstate commerce," but limits it ". . . to extend only to those

matters which are not subject to regulation by the States." Even
though the sales were "at wholesale in interstate commerce," the
state contended that the limitation of federal jurisdiction in Part II
prevents federal jurisdiction and since both California and Nevada
had regulatory systems which, it was assumed, could agree, no
limitation of state jurisdiction under Part I was applicable. But a
substantially unanimous Court held that the electric power in question came under federal jurisdiction while declining to place an
exact limitation on state jurisdiction.
The Court relied greatly upon its decision in Public Utilities
Commission v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co.,", which held that
regulation of wholesale electric power sales in interstate commerce
can only come through a congressional grant of power. This means
that the states cannot get the power through a mere limitation on
federal jurisdiction. Attleboro, the Court contended, clarified a
problem which was not answerable when the Act was passed. Such
arguments and similar ones based on the legislative history appear
8. 345 U.S. 295 (1953).

9. 41 Stat. 1073, 16 U.S.C. § 813 (1952).
10. 49 Stat. 847, 16 U.S.C. § 824 (1952).
11. 273 U.S. 83 (1927).
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remarkably weak, and yet, there must be some very sound reasons
for the Court to find as it did since even the justices who voiced
doubts as to the decision, do not dissent nor do they give better
12
reasons.
There are at least three discernable reasons other than the
statutory language for the Court to find as it did. First, the Court
believed that federal regulation over the situation presented by
Public Utilities Commission of California would conform closely
to the policy expressed by Congress when the Act was written.' s
In this way the Court presents its belief that federal rather than
state regulation was better in the case before it since the electric
power industry had expanded greatly in size and importance after
the Act was written and the industry at the time of the decision required the uniformity of regulation which the Federal Power
Commission could provide. Secondly, as indicated by the concurrence of Mr. justice Jackson, the Court believes that Congress
can and probably will review the Federal Power Act as the Court
has rewritten it. 4 Thirdly, the Court notes its policy of strictly
construing limitations to primary grants of jurisdiction.'3
The combined weight of these reasons seems to compel the Court
to decide as it does despite the fact that the reasoning of the decision
was so tenuous that it prompted Mr. justice Jackson in his concurring opinion to refer to the reasoning and holding, respectively,
as "psychoanalysis of Congress" and "our legislation" and Mr.
justice Frankfurter to say that he could not join in an opinion with
such "underpinnings."
Of the three reasons for finding federal jurisdiction in Public
Utilities Commission of California all are seldom so forcefully
present on one side as they were there. The first, who should regulate, is often not sufficiently clear to be determinative of a case, and
even where it is clear, justices will not be willing to fly in the face
of statutory words which they find to be even clearer.'6 The second, congressional review, is probably seldom consciously present,
but may enter into the decisions rather consistently as the Court
considers the effect of its decisions.' The effect of a decision in12.

See the concurring opinions of Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice

Jackson and the statement of Mr. Justice Frankfurter.
13. 345 U.S. at 302-03.

14. Id. at 320. "If Congress does not like our legislation, it can repeal
it-as it has done a number of times in the past"

15. Id. at 310.
16. See text infra at note 21.
17. See Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1, 11 (1957).
The Court referring to the no-man's-land which exists between state and
federal jurisdiction over labor relations said, "Congress is free to change the
situation at will."
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evitably involves the likelihood of congressional review and the
corresponding finality of the determination. The third, the strict
construction of limitations on federal jurisdiction, is generally a
very strong factor where the Court must construe ambiguous
language. It also is a consistent factor in cases concerning jurisdictional conflicts between similar state and federal agencies.
Perhaps a case which gives a clearer indication of the importance
of the last reason is Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin18 in which
the Court had to decide whether the state or the Federal Power
Commission had jurisdiction over the company's sale of natural
gas. Wisconsin, a consumer state, was contesting the Federal Power
Commission's holding that it was without jurisdiction over Phillips.
The company, insofar as it is in the natural gas business, was engaged in the production, gathering, processing, and sale of natural
gas. Phillips sold gas to five interstate pipeline transmission companies which in turn resold the gas after transporting it to the local
distributors and the ultimate consumers, but Phillips itself was not
engaged in the interstate transmission of natural gas to the consumer
markets from the production'fields. The Federal Power Commission
held hearings after which it issued an opinion stating that it did not
have jurisdiction over Phillips' operations since Phillips was not a
"natural-gas company" within the meaning of the Natural Gas Act;
therefore the Commission could not regulate Phillips' rates.
The jurisdiction of the Commission is derived from section 1 (b)
of the Natural Gas Act:
The provisions of this Act shall apply to the transportation
of natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate
commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and
to natural-gas companies engaged in such transportation or
sale, but shall not apply to any other transportation or sale of
natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to the
facilities used for such distribution or to the production or
gathering of natural gas.' 9 (Emphasis added.)
The argument for lack of Commission jurisdiction is based on the
limiting clause at the end of section 1 (b) of the Act. Phillips' activities clearly fall under the primary grant; they can only be excluded from Commission jurisdiction by the limiting clause. The
Court pointed out that the exceptions to the primary grant of jurisdiction are to be construed strictly. The Court then read the Act
18. 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
19. 52 Stat. 821, 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1952), amended after this case

arose by the addition of § 1 (c), 68 Stat 36 (1954).
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in the light of the cases and legislative history to give the Federal
Power Commission jurisdiction over Phillips' operations involving
natural gas.
An important factor in the Court's decision probably was that
".the rates charged may have a direct and substantial effect on
the price paid by the ultimate consumers. Protection of consumers
against exploitation at the hands of natural-gas companies was the
primary aim of the Natural Gas Act.'

20

However, the policy motiva-

tion was not sufficient to influence some of the dissenting justices
who were willing to concede that perhaps federal regulation would
be best.-"
There was no disagreement among the justices that the purpose of the Act was to provide regulation of the natural-gas
industry so that the consumers would not suffer at the hands of the
large companies which operate in the field. The Act which created
the jurisdiction and coverage of the federal agency was sufficiently
broad to cover nearly all the operations of the natural-gas companies which affect interstate commerce. This was the primary grant
of jurisdiction, but exceptions were carved out which purportedly
left to the states that which they traditionally were allowed to handle.
These exceptions to the primary grant of jurisdiction were strictly
construed.
The dissenting justices argued that the result of the regulation
thus imposed on Phillips would be effectively to nullify the exception
which Congress had included in the Act.2 This basic objection of
the dissenting justices can be reconciled to the proposition that
the Court strictly construes the limitations on the primary grant
of jurisdiction since what the dissenting justices really object to
is that there is no longer any limitation to federal jurisdiction, and
this, they point out, clearly contradicts the statute which sets out a
limitation. Thus they say, the majority has not resolved an ambiguity by strict construction at all, but has instead destroyed all prac23
tical regulation on the part of the states.
The practice of the Court strictly to construe limitations to
primary grants of jurisdiction, is but a correlary to a broader statutory construction device, that of strictly construing primary grants
20. 347 U.S. at 685.

21. See ibid. Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting at 688, and Mr. Justice
Clark dissenting with the concurrence of Mr. Justice Burton at 690.
22. See id. at 690.
23. Mr. Justice Clark believes that this decision leaves only regulation of unused facilities to the states. Id. at 695.
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of jurisdiction.2 4 That is, first one determines whether the primary grant includes the subject under dispute-this is strictly construed. Then, one determines if a limitation takes the subject under
dispute out of the primary grant-this is also strictly construed.22
However, this practice of the Court is more than a statutory construction device. It embodies an attitude of the Court which makes
the Court attempt to avoid being an instrument through which
jurisdiction is given. As is the case where state and federal jurisdictions conflict, the finding of a limitation on federal jurisdiction often
permits jurisdiction in the state; as a consequence, the Court is
26
doubly strict in its construction.
Where the exceptions and limitations create alternative or
concurrent state and federal jurisdictions, the pattern is such that
one might say that regulation over the area covered in the general
grant is the primary purpose, and that the only problem is who is to
regulate. The words used in the primary grant to define the area
of regulation intrinsically limit the area-both inclusively and exclusively. It is clear that Congress does not intend to give an
agency too much jurisdiction; therefore it is only necessary and
proper that the Court should construe the language defining the
general area of regulation strictly. On the other hand, where the
Court is confronted with the problem of an ambiguous limitation,
taking jurisdiction from the federal agency and thereby giving it to
the state agency, there are good reasons why the federal agency
should win. Federal jurisdiction will probably result in fairer
and more uniform regulation. Usually the danger in federal regulation is its inability to handle local needs where, for practical purposes, no national policy is involved. A national interest would seem
likely to be present from the very fact that there has been federal
legislation. Where the jurisdictional limitation is ambiguous it,
therefore, would seem proper to resolve the ambiguity in favor of
national regulation.
In some cases state and federal agency jurisdiction may be
concurrent. A state labor board may have jurisdiction over violence
24. See, e.g., United States v. Contract Steel Carriers, Inc., 350 U.S.
409 (1956).
25.

See Federal Power Commission v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line

26.

See the discussion of PhillipsPetroleum beginning in the text supra

Co., 337 U.S. 498 (1949), where there was ambiguity in both. the primary
grant and its exception, and Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 301 (1949), which finds power in the
state rather than the federal agency and can be explained by the analysis
in the text, as can the more usual case where federal jurisdiction is found. See,
e.g., Federal Power Commission v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464 (1950).
at note 18.
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even though such violence would also come under the regulation of
the National Labor Relations Board.2 7 However, in the recent
decision of Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board28 the Court refused
to be the instrument through which jurisdiction was granted to the
state labor boards to handle labor disputes within businesses over
which the NLRB would not exercise its jurisdiction because of selfimposed jurisdictional standards.
Disputes over jurisdictionwithin the federal regulatory systen.
In Powell v. United States Cartridge Co.29 the Court had to
determine whether the employees of a private contractor who operated a government-owned plant on a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract
with the United States came under the Fair Labor Standards Act 0
or whether they were excluded as being employees of the United
States. It was contended for the employees that they were neither
directly employed by the government nor employed by an agency of
the government and were thereby entitled to the overtime benefits of
the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Of the three contracts between the independent contractors and
the government which were before the Court, each provided that
the independent contractor was to be reimbursed for the cost of
labor, but each contract also said that the employees were not the
employees of the United States and that the contractor was not
an agent of the United States. This language in the contract could
not have been easily avoided by the Court if it had wanted to find
that the employees were excluded from the coverage of the Act;
however, the Court seems to have been impressed by the fact that
Congress did not operate the government owned plants itself and
thus preserved free enterprise.
The Court quite easily establishes that the munitions produced
at the plants in question are goods for commerce within the meaning
of the Act and that the Walsh-Healy Act 1 which applies to employees of employers with government contracts, and the Fair Labor
Standards Act are "mutually supplementary," not mutually exclusive. The Court also found that none of the war emergency actions
taken by the government prevented the application of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.
Such cases as Powell which present the problem of disputes over
27. United Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations

Board, 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
28. 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
29. 339 U.S. 497 (1950).
30. 52 Stat. 1060, amended 53 Stat. 1266, 54 Stat. 615, 55 Stat. 756, 61
Stat. 87, 63 Stat. 446, 910, 29 U.S.C. $ 201 (1952).
31. 49 Stat. 2036, 41 U.S.C. § 35 (1952).
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jurisdiction within the federal regulatory system do not'frequently
arise. The proposition which can be drawn from the cases which
have arisen is: the conflicting agencies or statutes will be held incompatible if there is a likelihood that they will conflict either in
their application or in their purpose,3 2 but probably will be held
to be concurrent or supplementary if the objectives sought and
the regulations themselves are substantially the same or will not
lead to conflict. 33
Ordinary disputes over the existence of jurisdiction.
Cases involving ordinary disputes over the existence of jurisdiction are likely to involve private litigants. The bases of the decisions
can vary from case to case to such an extent that a great many arguments are available to the contending parties. In cases concerning
the Pure Food and Drug Act, the Court will go very far to find
jurisdiction.3 ' In other cases the Court will find that the grant of
jurisdiction does not include an attempted regulation of a party, 85 or

a limitation may not be sufficiently broad to avoid jurisdiction. 8
There is a curious type of case concerning the existence of
agency jurisdiction. The Court has mentioned that it gives a sympathetic construction to legislation which provides for human
welfare, 87 but even this sympathy may be sacrificed when confronted with a statute which requires a construction of "interstate
commerce." 3 8 "Interstate commerce" is of course the usual constitutional basis for federal jurisdiction in administrative law; however, it may have a special or limited effect in a statute. Where a
kind of "interstate commerce" is the problem in jurisdictional cases,
the Court, even while recognizing that Congress has not given
jurisdiction to the extent capable under the commerce clause, seems
nearly always to find that interstate commerce has been affected in
32. See Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U.S. 649 (1947).

33. See id. at 686. Mr. Justice Rutledge dissenting. "Ordinarily, when
statutes are not inherently conflicting, the rule applied in construing them is
to give each as much room for operation as is consistent with its terms and
purposes, rather than to create conflict unnecessarily between them." See also
Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497 (1950).
34. See United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 694 (1948) (dictum).
35. See United States v. Champlin Refining Co., 341 U.S. 290 (1951).
There may be some question as to this being a jurisdictional problem per se,
but the effect appears to be jurisdictional.
36. See Local 25, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. New
York, New Haven & Hartford R., 350 U.S. 155 (1956).
37. See Morris v. McComb, 332 U.S. 422, 438 (1947) (dissenting
opinion).
38. See ibid. (majority opinion).
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the way mentioned in the statute.3 9 The jurisdictional result caused
by this "interstate" inclination does not always mean, but usually
does, that jurisdiction will be found to exist in the federal agency. 40
In FarmersReservoir & IrrigationCo. v. McComb,4 the field
employees of a company were found to be engaged in an occupation
resulting in the irrigation of crops which move in interstate commerce which meant they were necessary to the production of agricultural goods shipped in commerce, but because these employees were
only necessary to production, not having actually engaged in the
production, they were not excluded by the agricultural exemption
from the Fair Labor Standards Act. The actual business of irrigating was not in interstate commerce, but because of its necessity to
the production of agricultural commodities moving in commerce, it
comes within the coverage of the Act. To this decision Mr. Justice
Jackson wrote a heated dissent. In one of the more restrained
sentences he said, "If, as the Court holds, these employees are
engaged in production of agricultural crops for commerce, I do not
see how it can hold that they are not engaged in agriculture."4 2
Many of the ordinary jurisdictional cases involve definitions.
Cases have turned
on the application to the case of words such as:
"employer," 43 "common carrier," 44 and "manufactured. 4 "lManufactured" was the crucial word in East Texas Motor FreightLines,
Inc. v. Frozen Food Express4 6 in which the Court found against
the Interstate Commerce Commission in its claim of jurisdiction
over motor carriers which were transporting dressed, frozen
chickens. These chickens were held not to be "manufactured"
within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act which excepts from
ICC regulations all agricultural produce which has not been manufactured.4 7 The case was a very close one; the Court split five to
four. The denial of jurisdiction in Frozen Foods Express perhaps
39. See Alstate Construction Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13 (1953) ; United
States v. Capital Transit Company, 338 U.S. 286 (1949) ; Farmers Reservoir
& Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755 (1949) ; Morris v. McComb, 332
U.S. 422 (1947).
40. See cases cited note 39 supra.
41. 337 U.S. 755 (1949).
42. Id. at 772.
43. See Local 25, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. New York,

New Haven & Hartford R., 350 U.S. 155 (1956).

44. See United States v. Champlin Refining Co., 341 U.S. 290 (1951);

United States v. Contract Steel Carriers, Inc., 350 U.S. 409 (1956). In the
latter case the Court did not use the common law meaning of the words, but
instead said there was a statutory meaning, thereby preventing jurisdiction.
45. East Texas Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Frozen Food Express,
351 U.S. 49 (1956).
46. Ibid.

47. 49 Stat. 544, amended 66 Stat. 479, 49 U.S.C.

303(b) (1952).
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follows a trend to restore the importance of the agricultural exemption as a reaction
to former decisions of the Court which tended
s

4
to reduce it.

STATUTORY STANDARDS

Statutory standards are those phrases in statutes, such as
"public interest," which define the limits of agency consideration
and to which the administrative agency must conform when making
a determination. These standards differ from "jurisdiction," as
previously referred to, by being concerned with the determination
of what as a matter of substance must be considered or may be considered, rather than, the area of possible regulation. In a formal
sense, one might say that standards come into importance only after
the jurisdiction or coverage of the agency has been established;
thereafter, the question of whether the statutory standard has
been met may be determined.
The Court has often expressed its reliance upon the specialized
knowledge acquired through the experience of the agency in words
such as:
The growing complexity of our economy induced the Congress
to place regulation of businesses like communication in specialized agencies with broad powers. Courts are slow to interfere
with their conclusions when reconcilable with statutory directions. 49
Despite such statements the Court has not been overly anxious
to embrace agency findings. But the reasons for not doing so differ.
In this regard it is important to separate the cases which reverse the
agency because the agency has not indicated properly what it based
its decision on, and those cases where the Court disagrees with the
agency's application of the statutory standards. Perhaps the two
following statements will indicate the difference and show the
fundamental basis for the difference:
Mr. Justice Frankfurter: If judicial review is to have a basis for
functioning, the Commission must do more than pronounce a
conclusion by way of fiat and without explication.5"
48. Compare East Texas Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Frozen Food Ex-

press, 351 U.S. 49 (1956) with American Trucking Associations, Inc. v.
United States, 344 U.S. 298 (1953). See Helmetag, Judicial Expansion of
the Agricultural Exemption in the Motor Carrier Industry, 43 Va. L. Rev.
211 (1957).
49. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 203 (1956).
50. Federal Trade Commission v. Motion Picture Advertising Service
Co., 344 U.S. 392, 401 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
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Mr. Justice Douglas: Unless we make the requirements for administrative action strict and demanding, expertise, the strength
of modem government, can become a monster which rules with no
practical limits on its discretion. Absolute discretion, like corruption, marks the beginning of the end of liberty.5'
The first statement is a call for an account by the agency, clearly
indicating the basis of its determination; the second, a statement of
the need for the Court to impose standards, or see that those imposed are followed. The first would not, in any real sense, determine
a power if applied since Mr. Justice Frankfurter merely says that
the Court must understand the reasons why the case was decided
as it was; but the latter statement would concern the determination
of powers when applied since it would in many cases give the Court
at least the "last refusal" as to what an administrative agency does
or does not have to consider and at times permit the Court to "give"
power to an agency by finding that it has restricted itself by using
52
material from too small an area.
In Federal Communications Commission v. RCA Comm unications" the question was whether the FCC had conformed to statutory standards when it authorized Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co.
to duplicate services performed by RCA Communications. Its
authorization was based upon a national policy in favor of competition. The Commission found that while it had not been shown
that the duplicate services would be better, neither had it been
shown that they would impair the existing service. The Court
held that the Commission could not rely upon its interpretation of national policy, but must exercise its own informed judgment as to
whether the "public interest" will be served by competition. The
effect of this decision upon the FCC was most certainly a reduction
of power, but at least in one sense the decision increased the Commission's power. After this decision the FCC could, it was even told
to, exercise its own informed judgment to a greater degree.
Since standards such as "fair and equitable" 5 4 and "the need of
each such air carrier for compensation for the transportation of mail
'
sufficient to insure the performance of such service"55
are of such
a vague and intangible quality, whoever ultimately defines the words
51. New York v. United States, 342 U.S. 882, 884 (1951)
per curiam decision).

(dissent to

52. Federal Communications Commission v. RCA Communications, 346

U.S. 86 (1953). This is at least a possible analysis of the effect of the
decision. See the analysis in the text infra.

53. Ibid.
54. 49 Stat. 820, 15 U.S.C. § 79k(b) (1952).
55. 52 Stat. 998, 49 U.S.C. § 486(a) (1952).
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given by Congress to guide the agency to its proper objectives and
to limit those things which it may properly consider as justification
for a finding, will have a wide range within which to place a
meaning.5 6 The problem would seem to be one of deciding whether
Congress intended the agency or the Court to decide the meaning of
its enigmatic words, but the Court has apparently resolved the problem by allowing the agency broad discretion in interpreting statutory standards of this type. The result has been that the Court's idea
of what Congress meant, or should have meant, is usually reconcilable with what the agency has done. In this way the agency is
given considerable leeway in its use of standards even though the
Court does define the limit of the discretion of the agency. Even
where the Court finds that the agency has not properly applied the
statutory standards, the agency upon redetermination of the case
at times may reach substantially the same result while conforming
57
to the standards as defined by the Court.
Most of the cases allow a broad meaning to words where they
are in fact general words. Thus the Court said it was "fair and
equitable" under a reorganization plan that no recognition be made
of stock option warrants which had a market value, but not an investment value." However, at times the Court will, it appears, use
the statutory test or standard to reach its own idea of the best
policy. In Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Sunmerleld5 the Court read
the words which said that the Civil Aeronautics Board "shall take
into consideration" the need of a carrier before granting a subsidy,
to require that the Board must find need. 0 The Court said, "As we
read the Act, Congress has established a special formula for the
fixing of a subsidy rate.""',
ENFORCEMENT OR REMEDIAL POWERS

In cases which deal with enforcement or remedial powers the
Court more frequently uses the word "power" to describe the validity or lack of validity of an administrative agency's action, than in
either of the other two categories: jurisdiction and statutory standards. This is understandable since remedial powers come the closest
56. 346 U.S. at 91. The Court has "the responsibility of saying whether
the Commission has fairly exercised its discretion within the vaguish, penumbral bounds expressed by the standard of 'public interest.' ".
57. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Budd, 350 U.S. 473 (1956).
58.
59.
60.
believe
did not
61.

Niagara Hudson Power Co. v. Leventritt, 340 U.S. 336 (1951).
347 U.S. 74 (1954).
Id. at 78-79. The usual meaning of the words would lead one to
they meant that the CAB had to consider the need of carriers, but
have to find a need.
Id. at 79.
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to being physical actions. The distinction between "standards" and
remedial powers is analagous to the power of thought and the power
to act in the physical world in reliance on that thought.
Enforcement and other remedial powers will be discussed under
three subdivisions: (1) the functioning of the agency as a practical
matter; (2) powers found in the general purposes of the agency;
(3) powers derived from particular language. These three subdivisions do not result from a mathematical divisability nor are they
completely separable in analysis; however, such treatment both
shows their relative importance and facilitates their discussion.
The practicalfunctioning of an agency.
Where the case involves the practical need (or mechanical
need) of the agency to have a certain remedial power, the Court
will almost unvariably find that the agency has the power. 2 One of
the clearest statements of this attitude of the Court was made by
Mr. Justice Jackson in United States v. Morton Salt Co.63 The case
was one testing the power of the Federal Trade Commission to
compel corporations to report as to their compliance with a Court
of Appeals decree.
The Trade Commission Act is one of several in which Congress, to make its policy effective, has relied upon the initiative
of administrative officials and. the flexibility of the administrative process. Its agencies are provided with staffs to institute
proceedings and to follow up decrees and police their obedience.
• . .These agencies are expected to ascertain when and against

whom proceedings should be set in motion and to take the lead
in following through to effective results....
To protect against mistaken or arbitrary orders, judicial
review is provided.... Courts are not expected to start wheels
moving or to follow up judgments.... Those occasions [when
a court must become a prosecutor) should not be needlessly
multiplied by denying investigative and prosecutive powers to
other lawful agencies. 64
With this the Court upheld the Commission's power in a twentypage decision in which Mr. Justice Jackson admitted that the argument against authority in the Commission was based on an "elabo62. See Securities and Exchange Commission v. Drexel & Co., 348 U.S.
341 (1955) ; Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) ; NLRB v. Dant, 344
U.S. 375 (1953) ; NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Company of Miami, 344 U.S.
344 (1953); Federal Power Commission v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17
(1952).
63. 338 U.S. 632 (1950).

64. Id. at 640-41.

NOTE

rate and plausible argument" supported by authority, short of
holding. The decision was unanimous.
Power from the general purpose.
Enforcement or remedial powers found in the broad implied
powers given an administrative agency are commonly agreed to be
present in some form, but when a case arises where the question
must be answered as to a particular agency action, the problem
ceases to be an academic generality, and disagreement results. This
happened in American Trucking Association, Inc. v. United States5
where the Court had to determine whether the Interstate Commerce
Commission had the power indirectly to regulate motor carriers who
did not come under its regulation because of the agricultural exemption in the Motor Carrier Act.6 The regulation which the ICC
sought over the exempt carriers, was to be accomplished by rules
which directly applied only to non-exempt carriers. Through such
rules the ICC contended it was able to restore its ability adequately
to regulate the motor carrier industry which had been impaired by
certain practices of the exempt carriers by which licensed carriers
used the exempt carriers' equipment.
The majority of the Court held that the agricultural exemption
had to give way since "the rules in question [were] aimed at conditions which [could have] directly frustrate[d] the success of the
regulation undertaken by Congress. ' ' 1 7 The Court said, "The grant

of general rule-making power necessary for enforcement compels
this result.""" The dissent while agreeing that the Commission has
"broad implied powers to carry out the general purposes outlined
in the law," did not believe that the power as found by the majority
conformed either to the purpose of the Act or to its "clearly expressed provisions." 9
American Trucking Association illustrates that the primary
difficulty is often in determining what the general purpose of an
act is and even where general purposes can readily be seen, determining which of conflicting purposes should take precedence. 70
Where remedial power, if found, must be found in the general
authority, the Court in effect says: the power which the agency is
attempting to exercise is one which it was designed to exercise
65.
66.
67.
68:

344 U.S. 298 (1953).
See supra note 47.
344 U.S. at 311.
Id. at 312.

69. Id. at 327-28.
70. See .upra note 48 where the same problem arose in the context of a

jurisdictional dispute.
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and therefore the agency has the power. 71 Obviously where an
agency's remedial powers are determined from generalized provisions there will at times be disagreement over whether the use of a
power in a specific case reaches a good result, and so at times it
appears as though each case is decided on the basis of its isolated
merits.7 2 But this is seldom true, especially where the importance
73
of the power is not limited to a single case.
Powers from specific language.
This last subdivision deals with enforcement and remedial
powers which result from limitations created by expressly granted
powers. The restriction may be expressly set out as, e.g., "No
through route and joint rates applicable thereto shall be established
by the Commission for the purpose of assisting any carrier that
would participate therein to meet its financial needs ;,,74
or, it may
be by negative implication from some express grant of power as
where under the Taft-Hartley. Act the sole sanction against swearing falsely to a noncommunist affidavit is the criminal sanction
75
against prejury.
In NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Company of Miami 6 the Court
was called upon to determine whether the Board had properly
used the remedy of back pay which is available to it. The Board had
found that certain former employees of Seven-Up had been discriminatorily discharged and ordered their reinstatement. Along
with reinstatement the Board ordered the payment of back pay
on a quarterly basis. Generally, any wages made by an employee
while wrongfully discharged in violation of the National Labor Relations Act are set off from the back pay due. In ordering back pay
the Board's order differed from its former practice in one important
respect: "Earnings in one particular quarter shall have no effect
upon the back-pay liability for any other quarter." Former prac71. See Ayrshire Collieries Corp. v. United States, 335 U.S. 573, 582
(1949). "It seems too plain for argument that such broad authority is ample
for the modification of either proposed or existing rates or both."
72. See Brannan v. Stark, 342 U.S. 451, 466 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
73. See supra note 48. American Trucking had Justices Burton, Frankfurter, and Minton with the majority in an opinion adversely affecting the
agricultural exemption from ICC regulation and Justices Black and Douglas
dissenting while in Frozen Foods, Justices Black and Douglas were with the
majority for the agricultural exemption's application and the first three
justices were dissenting.
74. 54 Stat. 911, 49 U.S.C. § 15(4) (1952).
75. See Leedom v. International Union of Mine Workers, 352 U.S.
145 (1956).
76. 344 U.S. 344 (1953).
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tice of the Board had been to set off earnings over the entire period
of wrongful discharge. 77
The Court held the Board order to be entitled to enforcement. In
the words of the majority: "[The Taft-Hartley Act] charges the
Board with the task of devising remedies to effectuate the policies of
the Act." 78 These remedies are limited essentially only by their
reasonableness. "Subject to [the] limitations [of reasonableness],
however, the power, which is a broad discretionary one, is for the
Board to wield, not for the courts. In fashioning remedies to undo
the effects of violations of the Act, the Board must draw on enlightenment gained from experience." 79 The Court also draws from
the policies of the Act to support its decision. "It seems more
profitable to stick closely to the direction of the Act by considering
what order does, as this does, and what order does not, bear
appropriate relation to the policies of the Act."8' 0
The Court will, at times, avoid a restriction on agency power
as it did in United States v. Great Northern Railway."' There the
Court found justification in the policy behind the restriction, for
not requiring the restriction, and then interpreted the statute in the
light of the policy, thereby avoiding the restriction. But where
the Court does not have to manipulate the statute, it will not. Thus,
where the agency had another effective means of reaching the
objective which it was ostensibly prevented from reaching, the Court
did not feel called upon to extend its interpretive powers. 2 There is,
however, some sentiment on the Court for an agency to come into
the open when it is exercising a power which it has in practice, if not
3
in theory.
In contrast to the result usually achieved in the other cases
involving enforcement or remedial powers, where the restriction
is the result of a negative implication from an express grant of
power, the Court will, even though unsympathetic with the result,
deny the agency power. 4 By saying what tools an agency has to
77. F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 289, 293, 26'L.R.R.M 1185
(1950).
78. 344 U.S. at 346.
79. Id. at 346.

80. Id. at 348. See Federal Trade Commission v. Ruberoid Co., 343
U.S. 470 (1952) for a case which says essentially the same thing.
81. 343 U.S. 562 (1952).
82. See Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics
Board, 336 U.S. 601 (1949).
83. Id. at 611-12.
84. See Leedom v. International Union of Mine Workers, 352 U.S. 145
(1956) ; cf. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Brothers Co., 348
U.S. 511 (1955).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:271

work with, Congress in effect limits the number of tools. In Regents
8
the Court held that the
of the University of Georgia v. Carroll"
Federal Communications Commission is limited to the power to
grant, conditionally grant, or deny the issuance or renewal of a
license, and could not make an order affecting the validity of a contract between a radio station and a third party.
THE CASES IN GENERAL

If the original premise is accepted, that the Supreme Court
is in a sense responsible for the acquisition of powers by administrative agencies, the classification of cases may be helpful in reaching an understanding of the Court's decisions. But much can also
be understood, and understood more easily, by looking at all the
cases dealing with the powers of administrative agencies together.
The perspective permits the discovery of threads which run throughout the cases and which at times are important factors in the decisions.
Interested Parties.
The parties to an action, their relative interests and the results
sought by them, are factors which influence the Court in its determination of whether an administrative agency has certain powers.
The agency is, naturally enough, usually a party in the case in
some manner and its interests are nearly always considered. The
Court gives weight to what the agency believes its own powers to
be,"8 but the Court does not always follow the agency belief as to
its own powers. Not even where the agency expresses a belief in
its lack of power will the Court necessarily find that power is not
87
present.
In his dissent to Powell v. United States Cartridge Co.88 Mr.
Justice Frankfurter pointed out that the real controversy was
between the Army Department and the Department of Labor, Wage
and Hour Division, which administers the Act. He contended that
the Court found the employees to be within the Fair Labor Standards Act out of habit, and the result is that the government will be
paying and not a capitalist. "In such unique situations, especially,
we should heed our admonition against perverting 'the process of
86. See Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497 (1950) ;
Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautical Board, 336 U.S.
601 (1949).
87.

See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).

88. 339 U.S. 497 (1950).

NOTE

19571

interpretation by mechanically applying definitions in unintended
contexts.'

"89

Often when federal agencies conflict, interests must be balanced
and more than likely resolved on the basis of which agency has the
more specific delegation of power over the problem presented.
Thus, where the Postmaster General protested a mail subsidy rate
given an airline, he won ;9O but when the Secretary of Interior supported several Rural Electrification Associations in attacking the
Federal Power Commission's power to give a dam development
project to a private concern, the Commission, as the agency delegated with the discretion to make the policy decisions in the matter,
92
won."" The public interest is probably considered in many cases.
Furthermore, there will probably be a vocal minority protesting anything which appears to be a grab for power by an agency.93 The
cases concerning conflicting state and federal jurisdiction also
involve "interests of parties," but they have already been discussed.94

Consistency.
It is not surprising to find that an important consideration in
any determination by the Court that an administrative agency
has or has not a certain power, is the degree of consistency the
determination will have, both as to prior decisions and to the symmetry of the law. The importance of consistency, however, is somewhat diminished by the fact that each justice strives for this almost
mystical word, "consistency," in his own way. The result is, that
in a given decision, one may find a majority opinion, a concurring
opinion, and a dissenting opinion each finding support in what
each calls consistency. The importance of consistency is not only
reduced by the possible variations in the concept, but also because
consistency while important is at times disregarded in favor of some
factor deemed more important. This is clearly indicated by the
fact that the Court has not always followed stare decisis. Even with
89. Id. at 529.
90. See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Summerfield, 347 U.S. 74 (1954).
91. United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power Commission, 345
U.S. 153 (1953).
92. See Alabama Great Southern Ry. v. United States, 340 U.S. 216,
223 (1951). "We must not lose sight of the fact that the Commission has the
interests of shippers and consumers to safeguard as well as those of the
carriers."
93. See Mr. justice Douglas dissenting, Federal Power Commission v.
Oregon 349 U.S. 435, 452 (1955).
94.' See supra notes 8 to 28 and accompanying text.
95. See e.g., United States v. Champlin Refining Co., 341 U.S. 290
(1951).
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the foregoing qualifications the striving for consistency would
appear to be of some importance since a belief in consistency like a
belief in morality produces a state of mind which, although it may
not always allow prediction of specific results, does allow one to
assume a given attitude in the individuals with whom one deals.
"Consistency" stated by itself is a word which demands a context or continuum of sorts from which it can derive a meaning. The
question becomes, consistent with what? To support a claim that a
given result will either violate consistency or provide it, the Court
has spoken of consistency in several different ways. Perhaps the
most obvious is precedent-either stare decisis or a less precise
form. The Court has also looked to see whether a result will be consistent with what is believed to be the broad congressional purpose 0
This has been spoken of as finding a "harmonious effectuation of...
congressional objectives."' 7 Consistency has also been sought from
what may be termed similar practices, as where a regulation, new
to an industry, is similar to a regulation which has previously been
used in another industry.9 8 The consistency in the use of terms is
also mentioned at times: for example, a common law phrase like
"common carrier" may be said to have the common law meaning
when read in the context of a given statute.9 9 When the Court can
find that the words come to them with a "gloss" the difficulty of its
decision thereby diminishes.100
Congressionalreview.
Since the Court considers the effect of its decisions, it may at
times consciously or unconsciously consider the possibility of congressional review. While it will attempt to find only the agency
powers which Congress intended, congressional review may permit
the Court a more affirmative role in the law making process. 01
CONCLUSIONS

With such general considerations in mind as, interests of the
parties, consistency, and congressional review, another general out96. Ibid.
97. Local 25, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. New York,
New Haven & Hartford R., 350 U.S. 155, 160 (1956). See Federal Trade
Commission v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392, 406

(1953) (dissenting opinion).
98.

See Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics

Board, 336 U.S. 601 (1949) ; Ayrshire Collieries Corp. v. United States, 335
U.S. 573 (1949).
99. United States v. Contract Steel Carriers, Inc., 350 U.S. 409, 412
(1956) (dissenting opinion).

100. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 685 (1954)

(concurring opinion).
101. See supra notes 14 and 17 and accompanying text.
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line emerges from the classification of the cases. By strict construction of the statutes in jurisdictional cases the Court has imposed
a kind of judicial restraint over itself where confronted with ambiguous language. 02 The Court is reluctant to find jurisdiction
unless it is rather clearly present. In cases which concern the standards which define the considerations which should enter into an
agency determination, the Court has been somewhat less strict. 0 3 In
these cases the Court looks to see if the agency considerations can
be reasonably included within the prescribed standards. In the last
group of cases, enforcement and remedial, the Court is willing to go
to great lengths in trusting the agency's discretion. 0 4 There are
probably two principal reasons why the Court is so lenient with the
remedies devised by the agencies. (1) Many of the remedies are of
practical necessity to the agency and (2) the Court apparently believes that if an agency has conformed to both jurisdiction and the
statutory standards the remedy devised should be upheld if possible.
The general pattern then is a gradual relaxing by the Court of the
control it exercises over the powers of administrative agencies from
the strictness in determining agency jurisdiction and the less strict
interpretation of statutory standards to a great reliance on the
discretion of the agencies when they are concerned with enforcement and remedial powers.
102. See supra notes 5 to 48 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 49 to 61 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 62 to 85 and accompanying text.

